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Abstract
The use of le-sharing technologies, so-called Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, to copy music
les has become common since the arrival of Napster. P2P networks may actually improve
the matching between products and buyers we call this the matching e¤ect. For a label
the downside of P2P networks is that consumers receive a copy which, although it is an
imperfect substitute to the original, may reduce their willingness-to-pay for the original 
we call this the competition e¤ect. We show that the matching e¤ect may dominate so that
a labels prots are higher with P2P networks than without. Furthermore, we show that
the existence of P2P networks may alter the standard business model: sampling may replace
costly marketing and promotion. This may allow labels to increase prots in spite of lower
revenues.
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1. Introduction
Digital music les (mostly in MP3 format) have become widespread on the internet. File-sharing
systems pioneered by Napster and for a while dominated by Kazaa have become popular among
certain online communities and a target for legal prosecution by record companies. Industry
representatives partly attribute the recent drop in music sales (in Dollars and in units) to a
rise in online le-sharing, which, from the point of view of the record companies simply reads
as piracy of copyrighted material. For instance, in the U.S. alone an estimated number of 60
million people have downloaded MP3 les (see Ipsos Reid, 2002). Since the vast majority of
material on le-sharing systems is copyrighted material this means that almost the same number
has downloaded copyrighted material. The music industry has reacted by warning consumers
and ling court cases against copyright infringers as well as by implementing technological
measures of protection. These actions are based on the belief that music downloads are causing
a substantial damage to the music industry. Advocates of online le-sharing, however, believe
that le-sharing should be free and unrestricted. One argument goes that downloaders use the
downloaded les for sampling in order to make more informed purchasing decisions. Hence, the
argument continues, the music industry may actually benet from le-sharing networks.1
In this paper we analyze the role of sampling in music distribution. The argument of sam-
pling ts well many types of music  individually acquired information is very important for
music because of it is an experience good where horizontal product di¤erentiation and taste
heterogeneity are important. As the result of sampling, music labels may actually gain from
1This view is to some extent supported by survey data that show that a large share of internet users download
les for sampling. A share of 69% of downloaders listen to new music and 31% to music by artists never heard
before according to PEW internet tracking, July-August 2000. A share of 30% of respondents to an Ipsos
survey of 2002 acknowledged that the genre that they typically listen to/purchase has changed since they started
downloading (over a brief period of time), mainly because they were able to experiment with new genres and
new artists; for more details see Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004b). Note that the recording industry has tried to
use survey data to refute the argument that consumers spend more in the presence of P2P (see e.g. IFPI The
Recording Industry in Numbers 2003).
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P2P systems.2
Central to our analysis is the observation that there is a large variety of di¤erent titles
and albums available. Therefore, we consider a multi-product environment in which the substi-
tutability between products is explicitly taken into account. The positive e¤ect of sampling on
prot may be reected on the revenue or the cost side, that is,
1. music labels may a¤ord higher revenues in the presence of P2P or
2. music labels may be able to reduce their costs.
First, to the extent that sampling allows consumers to nd their favorite music, the demand
curve of consumers shifts outward and labels are able to achieve higher revenues. That is,
MP3 downloads and music sales are complements and this leads to higher prots. Second, to
the extent that sampling allows labels to save on marketing and promotion, their costs are
decreased.
We rst present a simple model which operates only on the demand side. We then present an
extension of the model to allow for marketing and promotion by the labels, that is, labels may
transmit information on product characteristics to consumers by marketing and promotion.3
Describing sampling only as a source of higher prots is a partial view as consumers have
the option to download and listen to music without paying for it. Consumers have to decide
2Recent empirical analyses lead to ambiguous results. Some studies show a negative e¤ect of downloads on
music sales (see e.g. Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2004a, and Zentner, 2004), whereas others nd a negligible or even
slightly positive e¤ect (see Oberholzer and Stumpf, 2004, and Boorstin, 2004). Liebowitz (2004) comes to the
conclusion that the overall evidence supports the view that le-sharing has hurt music sales; our own analysis
tends to support this view (see Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2004a,b). However, this nding does not invalidate our
argument that the music industry may gain from le-sharing. First, current le-sharing systems are not well-
designed for sampling purposes (see also the discussion section). Consequently, sampling has still the potential
to be prot-improving. Second, even if music sales decrease in spite of sampling, this does not imply that prots
fall since sampling may lead to signicant cost savings on marketing and promotion, see below.
3The view that a rm can transmit information on product characteristics is also expressed in the industrial
organization literature on informative advertising, see e.g. Rosen (1978) and Meurer and Stahl (1994).
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whether they simply keep the download or whether they buy the song or album this means
that a download can be a substitute to the purchase of a song or album. This substitution may
lead to a fall in the number of units sold or a lower price; the free download e¤ectively becomes a
competitor to the version which is sold. This competition e¤ect counteracts the matching e¤ect.
Our question then is: in which situations does the matching e¤ect dominate the competition
e¤ect?
To address this question we analyze a simple multi-product monopoly environment in which
the original and the copy are imperfect substitutes. To keep the analysis simple, we consider
a model with unit demand and full participation so that any increase in revenues stems from
higher prices. We postulate that consumers make uninformed purchasing decisions in the absence
of P2P. Information can only be revealed by sampling, for which a consumers incurs a xed
opportunity cost. Consequently, consumers sample all available songs or none. A consumer who
likes a particular song or album has a much higher willingness to pay for the song or album
for sale vis-a-vis the download, e.g. because she wants to possess the originalwhich comes
together with bundled items such as liner notes and other complementary material or because
the free download has some defects (see Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2004b). By contrast, this added
material has little value for a consumer who does not like the particular song or album.
If sampling leads to a better match between product and buyer his willingness to pay for
the original increases. However, a consumer has also the option to listen to the download and
not to buy the original. If the information acquired through sampling su¢ ciently increases the
consumerswillingness-to-pay, then consumers are willing to pay a higher price with P2P even
though free copies are available. Hence, P2P increases the labelsprots and the matching e¤ect
dominates the competition e¤ect.
In the extension, sampling provides an alternative channel of information transmission, which
allows labels to save on marketing and promotion. Here, the optimal business model in the music
industry may change and a signicant part of the marketing and promotion e¤orts may no longer
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be needed with P2P.4 We restrict our analysis to the extreme case in which sampling does not
provide additional information compared to the setup with marketing and promotion by the
labels. We nd that for certain parameters P2P reduces the labelsrevenues but at the same
time increases prots. This result is consistent with the claim by the music industry that revenues
have fallen. However, online le-sharing, if properly designed, has the potential to reduce the
costs of marketing and promotion such that prots in the music industry actually increase.
In e¤ect, sampling, which is an information-pull technology, is a substitute to marketing and
promotion, an information-push technology.
To summarize, in this paper the matching e¤ect either leads to an outward shift of demand
(section 3) or lower costs (section 4).
Related literature. There exists a growing theoretical literature on end-user copying (for
a review see Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2003). However, most of the literature does not address
sampling, or more generally copying as a means of information transmission. To the best of our
knowledge the only papers that address sampling are Duchene and Waelbroeck (2003), Gopal,
Bhattacharjee, and Sanders (2004), Takeyama (2003), and Zhang (2002).
Independent of our work, Gopal, Bhattacharjee, and Sanders (2004) show that for certain
parameter constellations of their model a rm increases its revenues in the presence of P2P. In
particular, some consumers with an intermediate interest in music rst download and then buy
the corresponding song or album if they like what they downloaded. These consumers would not
buy if P2P were not available. A limitation of their analysis is that the price for the version that
is for sale is not determined in the model but taken as a parameter. Also, they only consider a
single-product environment.
Duchene and Waelbroeck (2004) analyze the e¤ect of extended copyright protection on con-
4 In the music industry, these marketing and promotion costs constitute an important part of the average cost
of a CD. According to the RIAA, promotion costs are perhaps the most expensive part of the music business
today (see www.riaa.org). Chuck Philips (Record Label Chorus: High Risk, Low Margin, L.A. Times, May
31, 2001) reports that marketing costs can run from $3 per hit CD to more than $10 for failed projects.
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sumer surplus. For this they consider a single-product rm that decides how much costly tech-
nological protection to implement in di¤erent legal enforcement regimes.5 In this framework,
they show that increasing copyright protection has both a direct e¤ect on copiers but also an
indirect e¤ect on buyers as technological protection and prices increase with legal protection,
unambiguously reducing consumer surplus. Zhang (2002) argues that sticking to the traditional
distribution technology is wasteful from a social point of view when P2P technologies are avail-
able. He considers an asymmetric environment in which a star performer can distort demand
in its favor using the traditional distribution channel. Niche performers can partly compensate
this disadvantage by using P2P that gives them the opportunity to expose a share of consumers
to their music, increasing consumerswillingness-to-pay. Takeyama (2003) analyzes how copies
that provide information on the quality of a product can be used to solve an adverse selection
problem in a two-period durable good monopoly.6
Our contribution to this literature is to show in particular that copying improves the match
between the purchased product and the tastes of a particular consumer, an aspect which can
make consumer sampling benecial to a (multi-product) label. Also, sampling may lead to a
cost reduction for the label.
Our plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the model. In section 3 we
analyze the e¤ect of sampling as a means to reveal information to consumers and show that
labels may benet from this. In section 4 we extend the analysis to allow labels to reveal that
5Technological protection increases the consumersdisutility of a copy but at the same reduces the fair use
value of the original product (although they assume that the rst e¤ect dominates the second). A strengthening
of legal protection reduces the surplus of copiers through the increase in the expected penalty if caught copying.
6 In particular, if a consumer copies the product in the rst period, she learns its quality and can decide whether
to purchase in the second period. However, there are some consumers, call them captive consumers, who never
copy. Takeyama shows that there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the monopolist intertemporally price-
discriminates, selling to the captive consumers in the rst period and charging the price equal to the di¤erence in
valuation between the original and the copy to the other consumers in the second period. Takeyama then makes
the availability or non-availability of copies part of the rms strategy. She shows that the absence of copies (in
other words, the enforcement of copyright) is a (cheap) signal for low quality.
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information themselves, albeit at a cost. In this case labels may benet from sampling although
their revenues are reduced. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
We consider the problem of a multi-product monopolist. We focus on the matching e¤ect ac-
cording to which sampling allows consumers to pick their favorite music. In an extension (section
4), we introduce the rms e¤orts to provide information to consumers through marketing and
promotion and compare such a situation of traditional marketing and promotion to the situation
in which free downloads are available on a P2P distribution technology.
Products in the market. Suppose that a rm o¤ers N products. For the sake of simplicity,
we do not distinguish here between a single track and the album which contains this track.7 We
use the simple structure of the Salop circle: products are equidistantly located on a circle of
unit length. Product i is located at li on the circle and the distance between two neighboring
products is 1=N . This particular structure makes the analytical problem easy to solve.8
The rm. In our model a single rm sells all products, that is, we analyze the strategic
choices of a monopoly. The rm (or label) maximizes its prot  with respect to the prices
of the products it sells. Because products are located equidistantly, the prot-maximizing rm
will always charge the same price p across products.9 The rm incurs zero marginal costs of
7An interesting issue is whether consumers desire unbundling. This is achieved by the downloading of individual
songs in contrast to the purchase of an album which is a bundle of goods. In this paper we abstract from the
unbundling issue.
8Other models (such as the multinomial logit) may be chosen alternatively. In particular, the one-dimensional
spatial structure is merely assumed for convenience.
9 In reality, we observe uniform prices. This means that: (i) labels mostly do not use prices as a discrimination
device at least for new titles and albums within their repertoire and (ii) big labels do not follow di¤erent pricing
strategies. With respect to (i), our analysis focuses on a (locally) symmetric environment. Clearly, in the real
world there are winners and losers in the market for CDs and the market is asymmetric. However, since list prices
are rather uniform across albums these asymmetries are not reected in the pricing decision. With respect to
(ii), we abstract from strategic interaction between labels. To the extent that the big labels collude in prices, it
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production. In the case of CDs and other physical media this means that we consider the price
net of any marginal costs of production. Since the number of products is given we do not need
to consider any xed costs. Hence, in this setting the prot is equal to revenues.
Consumer behavior. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the circle and have an ideal
variety !. They buy one product if at all. Consumers initially do not know the location of the N
products. If consumers do not have downloaded they do not have any information and therefore
can only buy at random. Consumers who have downloaded a product perfectly learn the location
of that product on the circle. Hence, if consumers download all products the maximal distance
between a consumer and the product he likes most is 1=(2N).
Consumers follow a two-stage decision process
 Stage 1: Download yes/no, denoted by d = 1 for downloading and d = 0 for not download-
ing. After downloading consumers learn the location of each downloaded product.
 Stage 2: Buy one unit yes/no, denoted by b = 1 for buying and b = 0 for not buying.
At stage 1 our model has the feature that every consumer either downloads to the extent
that they learn the location of the product which is closest to his consumers ideal point or that
he does not download at all. For this, we assume that a consumer incurs an opportunity cost
s for downloading all products and that this opportunity costs is independent of the number
of downloads. In other words, there is a xed cost of downloading and a zero marginal cost.
With this simplifying assumption, we do not need to analyze consumer search and the resulting
optimal size of the sample. Hence, the consumer selects the most attractive product available,
which we assume to give a positive utility net of the download cost, i.e. r > s, to the consumer.
If the consumer has sampled all relevant products and selected the one closest to her ideal
location, then he decides whether to buy one or zero unit of this product. Note that for simplicity
does not really matter for the analysis in section 3 whether we consider a single label, as in this paper, or several
labels, as observed in reality. Indeed, the music industry has a history of alleged price collusion. For example, in
2003 the music industry reached an out-of-court settlement in the US on charges of price collusion.
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we assume that a consumer who samples music only derives utility from up to one song or album.
This allows us to stay within the unit-demand framework.10
We denote a consumers actions as (b; d). Here the decision at stage 2 may depend on the
information gathered at stage 1. The utility a consumer receives then depends on his actions
(b; d), his ideal variety !, and the price p, which is charged uniformly for all products.
Product di¤erentiation among downloaded les. Suppose that a product is located at l.
Then choosing this product gives the consumers a gross surplus equal to r   j!  lj, where r is
the surplus of a product located at the ideal location and  is the transport costparameter.
Parameter  measures the degree of substitutability between product: if  is large then products
are strongly di¤erentiated and therefore are bad substitutes for one another.
A consumers utility when he does not buy. A consumers utility who neither buy nor down-
loads is normalized to zero, v(0; 0) = 0. A consumer who downloads and consumes a product
located at l has utility v(0; 1) = r    j!   lj   s. Clearly, for r > s there are locations l such
that a consumer prefers (0; 1) to (0; 0).
The added value of originals. If a consumer purchases the original product he obtains an
added benet g(j!   lj)  0 which depends on the extent the product ts its taste. This added
benet reects the value of the original over the copy (such as additional songs unavailable on
P2P networks, lyrics, booklet, pictures, song information, feel-good factor to have indirectly
paid the artist, ...). We assume that g0 < 0 that is the less a product ts the taste of a consumer
the less the added benet. The underlying motivation for this assumption is that original cover
with lyrics and other bundled services are very valuable for somebodys favorite band or album,
whereas they have little or no value if the music is not appreciated. Similarly, possible defects
10We would like to comment on our unit-demand framework. In reality, some consumers who sample music
buy their most preferred music but keep listening to some of the downloads without obtaining the corresponding
originals. This additional utility from sampling may at least partly compensate for the sampling cost.
Although a model in which consumers derive utility from more than one product is certainly of interest, it is
less tractable than the present model with unit demand. In such an extended model sampling may lead to an
increase (or decrease) of the number of products purchased by a single consumer.
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of the copy matter little if the music is not appreciated. An important feature of the function
g is that consumers who make better informed choices are willing to pay a higher premium for
the original.
To simplify computations, we take the linear form g(j!  lj) = (1=2 j!  lj). This gives the
added benet of =2 for an original at the ideal location and zero added benet for a product at
maximal distance 1=2. Taking other functional forms would give the same qualitative results.
A consumers utility when he buys. If a consumer buys the original at location l and price p
he obtains utility
v(1; 0) = r + (1=2  j!   lj)   j!   lj   p
If he downloads and purchases the original version of a product he obtains
v(1; 1) = r + (1=2  j!   lj)   j!   lj   p  s
Clearly, for a given product v(1; 0) > v(1; 1). A consumer is only willing to pay the opportunity
cost of downloading s if he expects to be able to buy a product better suited to his tastes. Note
also that for a given product l, the utility gain from buying is (1=2  j!   lj)  p.
To summarize, a consumers utility can be written as
v(b; d) = maxfb; dgr + b(1=2  j!   lj) maxfb; dg j!   lj   bp  ds:
3. Sampling and the labels revenues
To highlight the basic trade-o¤ between availability and non-availability of P2P we analyze
the simple model presented in the previous section and elaborate on the trade-o¤ between the
competition and the matching e¤ect. In our simple setting, P2P is the only way to transmit
information about the characteristics of a particular album to consumers. While this is an ex-
treme assumption it allows us to clearly state our main point that P2P increases the information
available to consumers and that this may benet rms.
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The competition e¤ect. A consumer has to decide whether or not to buy the original. His
outside option is not to buy in the market. Then if P2P increases the expected utility to buyers
P2P increases the value of the outside option, which is not to buy any product. Here the
download becomes a competitor to the original and we refer to this as the competition e¤ect.
The competition e¤ect tends to reduce the rms prot.
With P2P consumers learn the location of all products and only consider the one which
is closest to his ideal location. Downloading is ex post rational for all consumers if it is for
the marginal consumers. A consumer is a marginal consumer if he is indi¤erent between the
preferred album to its left and to its right on the circle, i.e. j!  lij = 1=(2N) for those albums.
If a marginal consumer only downloads but does not buy his utility is
v^(0; 1) = r    1
2N
  s
If he does not download his expected utility is u(0; 0) = v(0; 0) = 0. We say that there is a
competition e¤ect if v^(0; 1) > u(0; 0) = v(0; 0) = 0 which is equivalent to
s < r    1
2N
: (3.1)
The matching e¤ect. There is a countervailing e¤ect: downloading enables a consumer to buy
the music he likes. In this sense, P2P leads to a better match between consumer and purchased
product, which increases his willingness-to-pay.
Without P2P consumers cannot distinguish ex ante between the di¤erent albums and buy at
random. The expected distance to the ideal variety is Ej!   lj = 2 R 120 ldl = 14 . Their expected
utility is therefore
u(1; 0) = Ev(1; 0) = r + =2  =4  =4  p
= r + (   )=4  p:
With P2P consumers who download learn the location of the products. The utility of a marginal
consumer is then
v^(1; 1) = r + 

1
2
  1
2N

   1
2N
  p  s:
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We say that there is a matching e¤ect if v^(1; 1) > u(1; 0). This is equivalent to
s   + 
2

1
2
  1
N

: (3.2)
For this condition to hold, the opportunity cost of sampling has to be su¢ ciently low. The
matching e¤ect tends to allow the monopolist to charge a higher price and still cater to all
consumers.
Clearly, for the sampling cost su¢ ciently low both the matching and the competition e¤ect
are present: it becomes worthwhile to download for any given purchasing decision. Combining
(3.1) and (3.2) we obtain
s  min

 + 
2

1
2
  1
N

; r   
2N

: (3.3)
As N large this condition becomes approximately s < minf( + )=4; rg.
We are interested in the analysis of situations in which both the matching and the competition
e¤ect are present. To do so, we have to bear in mind that the purchasing decision is endogenous.
We next explore the monopolists behavior for a given download decision and then endogenize
all decision variables.
Prices and prots without P2P. Since all consumers are identical ex ante (because they do
not know where products are located) the monopolists prot is
(p; d = 0) =
8><>: p if p  r + (   )=40 if p > r + (   )=4
The monopolist then sets its price so as to extract the full surplus from consumers and u(1; 0) =
u(0; 0). We therefore have the following result.
Lemma 1. Given d = 0, the prot-maximizing rm sets p0 = r + (   )=4 and makes prot
0  0(p0; d = 0) = r + (   )=4: (3.4)
All consumers buy.
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Prices and prots if all consumers download. Consider the other extreme scenario in which
all consumers use P2P, download all products, and consider buying their favorite product. Con-
sumers now make their decision in a full information environment. If all consumers buy the
product then the maximal distance between the location of the product and the ideal location of
any consumer is 1=(2N). Suppose that it is optimal for the monopolist to serve all consumers.
If a marginal consumer downloads but does not buy his utility is v^(0; 1). Alternatively, he may
decide to buy one of the two preferred albums after downloading. This gives utility v^(1; 1).
After downloading, a marginal consumer is weakly better o¤ buying if v^(1; 1)  v^(0; 1) which is
equivalent to
p  

1
2
  1
2N

(3.5)
If this inequality is satised the action (1; 1) gives a larger utility than (0; 1) also to inframarginal
consumers. Hence, given sampling, i.e. d = 1, if inequality (3.5) holds, all consumers buy, i.e.
b = 1.
To see that a multi-product monopolist does indeed want to serve the whole market, note that
in order to obtain demand x for a particular album the participation constraint v(1; 1)  v(0; 1)
has to be satised for all consumers in a neighborhood x=2 of that album. Prot for that single
album takes the form (=2)x(1   x). Consequently, prot-maximizing demand for that album
is x = 1=2. This implies that for N  2 the monopolist will cover the whole market. We
summarize with the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given d = 1 the prot-maximizing rm sets p1 = 
 
1
2   12N

and makes prot
1  (p1; d = 1) = 

1
2
  1
2N

: (3.6)
All consumers buy.
The protability of P2P. We can now compare prots. Since all consumers buy one unit
prots with P2P are greater than without P2P if p1  p0, provided that condition (3.3) is
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satised. This is equivalent to
r  
4

1  2
N

+

4
: (3.7)
Proposition 1. Suppose that the matching and the competition e¤ect are present, i.e. condi-
tion (3.3) is satised. The introduction of P2P leads to an increase in prices from p0 to p1 and
in prot from 0 to 1 if condition (3.7) is satised.
Proof. Consider rst the case that no P2P is available. Condition (3.3) implies that price
p0 is the prot-maximizing price and 0 the corresponding prot (see Lemma 1). Consider
now the case that P2P is available. Then, p1 solves v^(1; 1) = v^(0; 1) (see Lemma 2). That is,
if consumers download it is worthwhile for all of them to buy the version for sale at the second
stage of their decision process. Condition (3.7) implies that p1  p0. For p1  p0 we have that
u(1; 0)  u(0; 0) = 0. Finally note that condition (3.3) implies that v^(0; 1)  u(0; 0) this is
the competition e¤ect. To summarize these ndings, v^(1; 1) = v^(0; 1)  u(0; 0) = 0  u(1; 0).
Hence at the rst stage, consumers decide to download. Since condition (3.7) is satised, P2P
leads to higher prices and prot. Q.E.D.
As stated in Proposition 1 the introduction of P2P leads to an increase in prices and prot
if condition (3.7) is satised. How does this condition relate to the matching and competition
e¤ect? The size of the matching e¤ect can be measured by v^(1; 1)   u(1; 0) and the size of the
competition e¤ect by v^(0; 1)  u(0; 0). The matching e¤ect dominates the competition e¤ect if
v^(1; 1)  u(1; 0) > v^(0; 1)  u(0; 0). Proposition 1 has the following implication:
Corollary 1. The introduction of P2P leads to an increase in prices and prot if the matching
e¤ect dominates the competition e¤ect.
Proof. The condition that the matching e¤ect dominates the competition e¤ect can be
rewritten as v^(1; 1)  v^(0; 1) > u(1; 0)  u(0; 0). In the absence of P2P the rm sets p = p0. At
this point u(1; 0) = u(0; 0) = 0. Hence, the inequality from above becomes v^(1; 1)  v^(0; 1) > 0
14
at p = p0. With P2P the rm can therefore increase its price and still sell to all consumers at a
higher price. This leads to higher prots. Q.E.D.
For P2P to be benecial it is necessary for the label to be a multi-product rm. Namely,
N > 2 is a necessary condition so that inequality (3.7) can be satised. This can be explained
by the disadvantage to reveal information for a single product o¤ered by the label. With P2P
(so that information is revealed) the added value for the marginal consumer determines the
price whereas without P2P consumers have to take expectations so that the average added
value determines the price  with a single product the average added value is greater than
the added value at the margin. If the label o¤ers more than two products sampling allows
consumers to pick a product which comes quite close to their ideal location and the value from
information is larger the larger N . By contrast, without sampling an increase in the number of
albums does not lead to better choices on average. This captures the multi-product aspect of
sampling; an aspect which is absent in other work (see our literature review in the introduction).
Our result thus highlights the role of labels o¤ering a large number of products under P2P: it
provides consumers the possibility to make more informed choices. Consequently, the larger the
number of products the more likely that condition (3.7) is satised. For N large, we must have
approximately r < ( + )=4.
We also observe that a higher transportation cost and a higher value of the original (for
N > 2), which is measured by , tend to make P2P more attractive for the rm. This is
explained by the advantage of P2P: consumers obtain the product which better ts their tastes.
Numerical example. A numerical example may be helpful for illustration. Suppose that
s = 1=2, r = 3=4, and  =  = 2. First note that condition (3.3) is satised for N  4. Also
condition (3.7) is satised if N  4. Independent of N we have without P2P that p0 = 0 = 3=4.
We have with P2P that p1 = 1 = 1  (1=N).
Welfare. If P2P leads to higher prot (i.e. if the conditions of Proposition 1 hold), we have
an unambiguous welfare result. Welfare necessarily increases because without P2P consumers
obtain zero net surplus whereas with P2P inframarginal consumers obtain a strictly positive net
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surplus. (Marginal consumers still obtain zero net surplus in this latter case.) Therefore we
have the following welfare result: if the conditions of Proposition 1 hold, introducing P2P leads
to a Pareto-improvement, that is, the rm and all consumers are better o¤.
Music genre. Our model can be applied to music in general or to music of a specic genre.
With respect to the rst interpretation if a consumer nds out about new genres thanks to
le-sharing then this simply means that in the absence of le-sharing he is restricted to consume
music which he is used to and that provides a rather bad match to his tastes. The discovery
of a new genre that he prefers then leads to a better match. With respect to the second
interpretation, le-sharing may lead to additional demand if consumers learn about genres of
music they did not know before and they like, provided that they do not substitute one genre
of music by another. Following the second interpretation there is a demand-increasing e¤ect of
P2P which is not included in our model. If we took this additional e¤ect into account our result
would be reinforced.
Downloads and loyal music buyers. Proposition 1 was derived under the assumption that
all consumers download. A straightforward extension is to consider a population mix in which
a share  of the population never downloads. We call consumer belonging to this group loyal
music buyers because they do not consider substituting purchased versions for downloaded les.
If these consumers are informed about the di¤erent albums (perfect precision) then, if  is not
too large, the labels maximization problem has the solution that both groups buy the original.
The price is determined by the incentive constraint of the downloaders. If loyal music buyers
are less informed about the albums then, for certain parameter values, the price is determined
by the participation constraint of the loyal music buyers. Even if loyal music buyers have the
same ex ante information as downloaders prots may be higher with P2P (a necessary condition
is that  is not too large). However, in this case loyal music buyers do not buy at all when P2P
networks are available.
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4. Sampling and cost reduction
In the previous sections we have assumed that sampling is the only means for consumers to
gather information. This can be criticized on two grounds. First, as a matter of fact labels
spend large amounts of resources on marketing and promotion. This can be seen as an attempt
to inform consumers. Our model did not allow for the possibility that labels spend on marketing
and promotion. Second, there is some empirical support for the claim that le-sharing negatively
a¤ects revenues (see footnote 2). However, such nding does not invalidate our previous result
that revenues increase because current le-sharing systems are not well-designed for sampling
purposes. Nevertheless, it seems to us useful to point out that the matching e¤ect can also
operate on the cost side of the label and that higher prots with P2P are compatible with lower
revenues.
In this extension we show that sampling may lead to higher prot even if revenues are
decreased. Revenues are lower if labels have to lower their prices to make downloaders buy the
original compared to a situation in which downloads are not available. However, since labels
save on marketing and promotion they may enjoy higher prots.
We make our argument in a slightly extended model. We stick to the monopoly set-up.11 In
our basic model, consumers only received information about the location of products through
downloading. In this extension, the label decides whether to fully inform all consumers about
the location of its products through marketing and promotion. It can do so by spending a cost
c.12 For simplicity and consistent with our specication of sampling costs, this cost does not
11To be directly applicable to a multi-label context, rms not only must collude over price, in addition, they
must jointly do the marketing and promotion of their products. Otherwise, provided that they choose to inform
consumers, their aggregate expenditure for marketing and promotion is likely to exceed those under monopoly.
This reinforces our result about the protability of P2P.
12This is clearly an extreme assumption. A major problem for labels is to transmit information and because
of high costs it may refrain from transmitting the full information. In a follow-up paper (Peitz and Waelbroeck,
2004c) we use a related model and elaborate on the information transmission through marketing and promotion.
In that model, a label often decides to only partially inform consumers. In this case the following result can be
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depend on N . To summarize, we analyze a market in which the rm rst sets the price and
decides whether to inform consumers itself, second consumers decide whether to download and
third whether to buy.
Prices and prot without P2P. From Lemma 1 we know that the rm makes prot r+( )=4
if it does not use marketing and promotion. Otherwise, assuming that the rm maximizes its
prots by selling to all consumers it sets its price equal to r+ (=2)(1  1=N)  =(2N). In this
latter case its prot is r + (=2)(1  1=N)  =(2N)  c. It is prot-maximizing for the rm to
use marketing and promotion if c < +2
 
1
2   1N

. Clearly, marketing and promotion can only
increase prot if N > 2.
Prices and prot with P2P. If consumers are informed via marketing and promotion they
can simply download their favorite song (given our assumption that downloading only has a
xed opportunity cost for consumers, they incur this cost also when downloading a single le).
If consumer ! buys the product he has utility v(1; 0), if he downloads he has v(0; 1). Hence,
the rm that uses marketing and promotion (and sells to all consumers) has to set the price
such that v(1; 0)  v(0; 1) for all values of j!   lj with j!   lj  1=(2N). This is equivalent to
p  s+   12   12N . Alternatively, if consumers are not informed via marketing and promotion,
Lemma 2 applies and the rm sets p = 
 
1
2   12N

. Hence, not to use marketing and promotion
is protable if and only if c > s. In this case it is more costly to transmit information via
marketing and promotion than to let consumers sample.
The protability of P2P. As shown above, if s < c < +2
 
1
2   1N

the introduction of P2P
leads to sampling instead of marketing and promotion. Then the rm has a higher prot if

 
1
2   12N

> r + 
 
1
2   12N
   2N   c which is equivalent to c > r   =(2N). Hence, if the
value of a copy r is low compared to the cost of transmitting information through marketing and
promotion, the rm benets from P2P. However, provided that the competition e¤ect is present
shown: The introduction of P2P leads to (i) higher prot but (ii) lower revenues, (iii) a replacement of marketing
and promotion by sampling, and (iv) better informed consumers. Our result documented in Proposition 1 shares
features (i) and (iv). In this section our result documented below shares features (i)-(iii) but not (iv).
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so that r  2N > 0, prices and revenues are lower with P2P. To summarize, if c > r =(2N) > 0
prot increases with P2P but prices and revenues decrease.
5. Discussion and conclusion
We have analyzed the impact of sampling on prots. We placed our analysis in the context of
the music industry where music used to be bought on CDs but has recently become available in
the easily transportable MP3-format on le-sharing networks. If consumers download and listen
to music to nd out which music they like to buy, we referred to as sampling. This improves
the matching between products and buyers and tends to make downloads complements for CDs
this has been called the matching e¤ect. On the other hand the fact that downloads can be
consumed without buying the corresponding CD tends to make downloads substitutes for CDs
this has been called the competition e¤ect.
The main question is whether music labels necessarily su¤er from downloading on le-sharing
networks. In our basic model prots increase for a certain set of parameters because the price of
CDs increases after the introduction of le-sharing networks and consumers make more informed
purchases after the introduction of P2P. In an extended model we show that prots can increase
even though the price of CDs falls. Here, the fall in revenues triggered by the presence of P2P
is more than o¤set by the reduction of costs for marketing and promotion.
Furthermore, if promotion and advertising costs are signicant at the margin or even pro-
hibitive as in our main analysis, less information is transmitted in a traditional distribution
system than under the use of P2P. This is an admittedly simplifying picture: even a P2P
network that works with advanced search tools such as cross recommendations and individual
recommendations based on past downloads is unlikely to provide full information (see below).
However, we do believe that customized information available through P2P networks is likely to
generate better recommendations than blindmarketing and promotion.13 We would therefore
13Even in a world in which information is acquired via P2P, marketing and promotion still plays a role. In
particular, targeted online advertising seems a way to combine information-push and information-pull technologies.
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argue that our model is a bit simplistic but a useful starting point for further research. Below
we discuss a number of modications and extensions of our model.
The cost of downloads to consumers. Our model can be easily extended to account for the
case of positive opportunity costs of sampling an additional le. If consumers have a positive
and su¢ ciently high opportunity cost of sampling additional songs they do not sample all songs.
Indeed, in reality consumers only sample a subset of available songs. However, if this sample is
su¢ ciently large and if consumers can be guided in their sampling towards their favorite music
the qualitative features of our main result still hold. In the opposite extreme, if the opportunity
cost of downloading an additional le is large for all users even for a small sample, consumers
would hardly sample at all and P2P would not be a threat to standard business models. On an
intermediate range, consumers engage in some search but fall short of nding their best match.
A formal analysis with a directed search model seems promising to us.
Market coverage. In our simple model we assumed that the market is always covered. For a
di¤erent set of parameters the market is not fully covered with P2P so that some consumers do
not buy originals at all. Even in this case P2P may be prot-increasing because a labels markup
can be drastically improved and this may overcompensate the loss in units sold. This means
that in our model, both price and quantity sold may decrease after the introduction of P2P but
prots nevertheless increase because labels save on the cost of marketing and promotion.
Variable individual demand. Several surveys have asked whether P2P has increased or de-
creased the number of purchases for a given period (see e.g. Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2004b).
To formally address this question, our model with unit-demand would need to be modied to
include variable individual demand or at least partial participation. In such a model the match-
ing e¤ect, which in general increases the marginal willingness to pay, leads to an outward shift
of the individual demand function. On the contrary, the competition e¤ect leads to an inward
shift of the individual demand function. With respect to revenues and costs the same economic
mechanisms as in our simple model seem to be at work.
New business models, consumer information, and directed search. The music industry seems
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to have recognized that the only alternative to P2P networks on which copyrighted material
is exchanged for free is the online sale of music in MP3 or other (better) compressed formats.
Then as consumers pay a price for these downloads, downloading becomes a positive source of
revenue in itself.14 Selling downloads requires the music industry to strike a balance between the
consumersinterest in unrestricted use and compatibility and the industriesinterest in avoiding
the transfer to other consumers.
Of particular importance is the question to which extent these new business model allow
sampling and more generally information transmission. They have the potential to reduce infor-
mational ine¢ ciencies of the traditional distribution system by promoting and recommending
new products online and targeting only consumers who have the highest likelihood to purchase
(either a download or music in a traditional format such as a CD). Using smart software to track
past purchases and streaming and to recommend new music based on purchases of consumers
with similar taste would allow record companies to save on the large costs of marketing and
promotion by transferring part of the cost of information transmission to consumers who are
better informed about their own tastes (and may to some extent even enjoy sampling).15 This
may lead to directed search by consumers so that the associated sampling cost is much lower
than with current le-sharing systems, which, with the existing software, are not very helpful
in guiding the consumer to his favorite music. However, for directed search to work consumers
must be allowed to experience the product. Currently, intermediaries who provide pay-per-
download services typically provide some information to consumers which may facilitate search
but free listening is severely restricted (30 seconds listening to a song cannot substitute listening
to the full song).16
14Recent experiences with iTunes in the US and OD2 in Europe suggest that nally there may exist viable
business models to sell downloads to consumers. In particular, iTunes, which was launched in mid 2003, claims
to have sold more than 150 Mio. downloads by November 2004.
15Clearly targeted marketing and promotion can also reduce costs. However, even in this case record companies
still have to pass information to a heterogeneous group of consumers.
16An exception is the digital-right-management solution recently adopted by Kazaa which allows consumers to
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Star and niche performers. It is a salient feature of the music industry that there are some
star performers and many other artists whose albums sell on a much smaller scale. Perhaps
the main reason is that some music appeals to many listeners whereas other music to few.
Such asymmetry can be introduced into our Salop model. Two specications come into mind:
(a) the present setting with an additional quality dimension (consumers then learn about
the horizontal characteristic and quality through sampling); (b) the present setting with the
modication that products are not equidistantly spaced on the circle. In the absence of P2P,
labels only promote acts with a su¢ ciently large drawing. Sampling then can lead to more
successful small actsbecause high xed costs of promotion can be avoided  this may lead
to more music variety.17 Further explorations along these lines are certainly of interest and we
plan to continue our research in this direction.
Music variety. In this paper we treated the number of products, i.e., albums or titles, as
given. The lobby of the music industry has painted the horror picture of a world without music
as online piracy takes over and rips artists and record companies of their sources of revenues.
This is clearly a caricature as musicians have other sources of revenues such as live concerts and
do not only respond to monetary incentives.18 Moreover, P2P networks allow new artists to
enter the market with lower distribution and marketing costs.
The less drastic statement that the denition and enforcement of property rights a¤ects the
productionof music certainly cannot be dismissed. Hence, it would be of interest to analyze
how P2P a¤ects the variety (and quality) of music. Since variety of artistic expression is often
seen as a public good in itself, research in this direction would contribute to the public policy
listen to a song for free for a certain number of times before purchase.
17This would also be the case if marketing and promotion were successful in targeting the relevant consumer
segment. However, labels are apparently not able to devise such a ne-tuned targeting technology.
18As Gayer and Shy (2004) have shown in a model with network e¤ects, music labels and artists are likely to
have conicting interest over the availability of free downloads. The reason is that a larger number of downloads
tends to increase the popularity of the artist. This in turn gives higher revenues to the artist (but typically not
to the label) through live concerts.
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debate. Such an analysis would certainly be value-added but would in our opinion benet from
a more elaborate model in which artists are an additional group of players in the market.
Sampling of other digital goods. We have placed the analysis of sampling within the music
industry. Repeated use and the discovery of product characteristics are also key feature of
other industries such as software and video games. In these industries it is a standard practice
to distribute demos and free trial versions which allow consumers to sample. Consumers are
expected to buy the product if they want to continue using them after some period. Hence, in
these industries rms have already partly recognized the importance of sampling and adjusted
their business strategies.
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